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F O R E W O R D
On 2 February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a working group to prepare Fin-
land’s national CBRNE Strategy. There are several actors involved in CBRNE work at the na-
tional level and it was found necessary to establish shared objectives for them as regards 
threats and preparedness for them alike.
A group of organisations working across a broad range of CBRNE themes was assembled 
for this purpose. For the strategy formulation work, a group of authors was set up, and the 
sections of the working group (operational section, industry section, and research, devel-
opment and training section) participated actively in the work. In addition to authorities, 
research institutions and enterprises were also represented in the sections.
The Strategy describes the current state and the duties and responsibilities of the key 
CBRNE actors. Eight areas in need of development emerged in the actual strategy work, 
and proposals for the development measures required were formulated. Activities must be 
developed with a determined approach and on the basis of commonly agreed objectives.
The Strategy was considered at the Security Committee meeting of 11 December 2017.
Now that the Strategy is completed, I would like to thank the members of the working 
group, those who participated in the sections’ work and, in particular, the group of authors 
for the successful completion of the work.
Esko Koskinen
Chairperson of the working group 
Director General for Rescue Services
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1 Aim of the Strategy
CBRNE threats refer to hazardous incidents caused by chemical substances (C), biological 
pathogens (B), radioactive material (R), nuclear weapons (N) and explosives (E) as well as 
by the misuse of expertise related to these.
On 2 February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a working group to prepare Fin-
land’s national CBRNE Strategy. In CBRNE strategy work, national objectives for the various 
actors are set as regards CBRNE threats and related preparedness. The aim is to improve 
national coordination between the various actors and guide national CBRNE planning. 
The overall aim of this CBRNE Strategy is to continuously improve the prevention of and 
preparedness for CBRNE threats and incidents in order to safeguard society and secure the 
functions vital to society. The Strategy presents the most important areas of development. 
It also puts forward an action plan for implementing the areas of development and the 
objectives of the Strategy. The various actors’ awareness about CBRNE risks and prepared-
ness for their prevention will increase through the measures identified. In addition to the 
needs identified in collaboration between the authorities, the Strategy has been formulat-
ed against the backdrop of, for example, the implementation of the Security Strategy for 
Society, Finland’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, National Risk Assessment, the EU 
CBRN Action Plan, Decision No 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health, 
the obligations of the WHO’s International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) binding on Fin-
land and the recommendations of Finland’s Joint External Evaluation (WHO/JEE) of public 
health risks. The target group of the Strategy document consists of the authorities respon-
sible for guidance and supervision and actors in the fields of healthcare, research, training, 
industry, trade, import and export relating to the CBRNE domain.
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2 Description of current state
In Finland, the development of collaboration to counter CBRNE threats has arisen from practi-
cal needs. Before the turn of the millennium, cooperation focused mainly on preparedness for 
activities in emergency conditions. Changes in the operating environment have shaped coop-
eration between the authorities towards preventing CBRNE threats in normal conditions and 
developing activities in the event of incidents. In addition, when Finland acceded to the Europe-
an Union, a new European guidance element was introduced to activity-related guidance and 
cooperation, providing Finland with new binding action programmes and legal instruments.
Various civilian and military actors have cooperated nationally and internationally in the 
CBRNE domain to develop CBRNE threat prevention and their preparedness and capabilities 
to respond to various CBRNE threats. In 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a CBRNE 
strategy working group acting at the Government level to harmonise the various measures. 
In addition, CBRNE cooperation has taken place in a cross-administrative CBRNE cooperation 
forum on criminal activity established in 2008 and headed by the Police. As regards prepar-
edness for and prevention of biological threats, the Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (BU-
OS) combines the resources of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) and the National Institute for 
Health and Welfare (THL) also concerning intentional release. As regards chemical threats, the 
Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health forms a cooperation network for various experts.
Internationally, the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and relat-
ed materials is controlled under a variety of agreements, arrangements and political initiatives. 
Instruments including conventions on the restriction or prohibition of weapons of mass de-
struction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, export control arrangements and various strat-
egies provide states with obligations and a framework for preparedness for CBRNE threats.
On 6 November 2007, the Council of the European Union communicated the Action Plan on 
Enhancing the Security of Explosives, and on 12 November 2009 it adopted the EU CBRN Ac-
tion Plan to counter CBRN threats. The EU Action Plans aim to reduce the threat of and possi-
ble consequences for citizens arising from CBRNE incidents by means of coherent cooperation 
involving all relevant stakeholders. Threats and related preparedness measures are also deter-
mined in the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the CBRNE 
strategies of NATO and many of Finland’s important partner countries.
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3 CBRNE operating environment and 
CBRNE threats
In broad terms, CBRNE incidents may involve not only CBRNE substances produced for 
actual weapons use, but also hazardous incidents and communicable disease epidemics 
caused by hazardous substances and other materials. As regards the various actors, CBRNE 
incidents may relate to the transport, use, possession or storage of hazardous substanc-
es. In the context of preparedness, CBRNE threats are examined broadly in this Strategy 
because, as a general rule, the preparedness measures concerning them are the same, re-
gardless of whether the incident is unintentional or intentional. As regards threat scenari-
os, however, there is a greater focus on CBRNE incidents arising from deliberate intention 
to cause harm. (This Strategy refers to intentional incidents as ’CBRNE threat situations’.)
Changes in the foreign and security policy operating environment are continuing in Fin-
land’s neighbouring areas and also globally. New challenges and uncertainties such as 
conflicts and migration in Europe’s neighbourhood, climate change and consequent nat-
ural disasters are testing society’s crisis resilience. Global mobility is increasing the proba-
bility of communicable disease epidemics. Violent extremism and extreme ideologies and 
weak or failed states provide a breeding ground for international terrorism. Threats also 
include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related hazardous materials 
and expertise. Science and technology advances also create challenges as regards prepar-
edness for diverse CBRNE threats.
Terrorist organisations and networks undergo transformations and are capable of utilising 
other forms of cross-border crime as well as new technology, including information net-
works and materials used in weapons of mass destruction. The threat of terrorism against 
Finland has increased and diversified. The potential combined use of CBRNE substances 
with conventional explosives cannot be ruled out.
Terror attacks elsewhere in Europe may set an example for similar attacks in Finland, too. 
The possibility of such strikes carried out by these perpetrators, who often act alone, is in-
creased by the easy access to CBRNE substances and their precursors and the abundance of 
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online instructions on how to make them. The threat scenario regarded as the most prob-
able involves attacks that aim to cause personal injuries or fatalities, but which are likely to 
remain rather limited in terms of the affected area and may also have underlying motives 
other than ideological or religious ones. The most commonplace types of CBRNE risks may 
feature vandalism, threats or disruptive behaviour involving non-hazardous or harmful sub-
stances. The most extreme risk is serious criminal activity involving CBRNE substances. The 
possibility of a military CBRNE threat must also be considered in preparedness work.
In normal conditions, CBRNE incidents can be caused by accidents or natural communi-
cable disease epidemics, vandalism, criminal use of CBRNE substances or a terror attack. 
Growing military threat aimed at our country may result in the use of CBRN measures or 
CBRN weapons for pressurisation, attacks against vital targets or disruption burdening 
the entire society. An intentional CBRNE attack may be targeted at an individual, building, 
public transport vehicle or an extensive area. Targets may also include food and drinking 
water and related infrastructure. Depending on the intended impact, the target is affect-
ed by contamination with or exposure to a selected substance or pathogen, release of a 
substance that is similar to the actual substance but non-hazardous, or a threat of CBRNE 
substance use issued at the target. Depending on the substance used and the intended 
impact, there may be major variation in the equipment and methods employed to release 
the substance and deliver it to its target.
In addition to unintentional CBRNE incidents, cases classified as intentional CBRNE threat 
situations occur regularly in Finland. The annual number of accidents involving hazardous 
substances exceeds 300 in Finland. Serious incidents have been rare so far.
CBRNE substances and their impacts
CBRNE substances and their impact mechanisms differ significantly from each other. De-
pending on the substance and method of use, impacts can be slight or serious. Due to 
their extensive impacts, CBRNE weapons are also called weapons of mass destruction. Un-
predictability of the dispersion patterns and impacts of CBRNE substances, mental images 
associated with the topic and poor sensory detectability of substances may cause strong 
psychological impacts.
In this context, examples of chemical substances (C) include chemical warfare agents, bi-
ological toxins, incapacitating agents, riot control agents and toxic industrial chemicals. 
Symptoms caused by chemical substances may appear within a few seconds or only after 
several hours from the time of exposure. A person or target exposed to a chemical sub-
stance may cause the further spreading of the contaminant. Depending on the chemical 
substance and its spreading method, the danger zone varies from a few tens of meters to 
up to tens of kilometres.
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In this context, biological substances (B) are modified microorganisms (bacteria, viruses or 
protozoa) capable of inducing infection and disease mostly occurring naturally in the en-
vironment and organisms. A pathogen may also have been artificially modified in order to 
produce a more serious disease or make treatment more difficult by, for example, increas-
ing antibiotic resistance. Impacts may appear within several hours, days or even weeks. In 
a B incident, the immediate danger zone and duration and extent of impact in the popula-
tion varies a great deal from a few short-term cases of ill health to long-term cross-border 
epidemics.
Radioactive material (R) emits radiation that has two types of adverse health effects, deter-
ministic effects and stochastic effects. Impact of radioactive material may be experienced 
by people through exposure to external radiation or intake of radioactive material.
Radioactive material dispersed with the explosive method (a dirty bomb) may contami-
nate a maximum area of a few square kilometres to the effect that urgent protection and 
decontamination measures are required. A strong radiation source left in a living environ-
ment without its protective cover may affect the health of those within around 100 metres 
and expose those within up to hundreds of metres. A serious accident in a nuclear power 
plant could cause a radiation incident requiring protection measures only in case of seri-
ous reactor damage or non-functioning of safety functions as planned.
The extreme destructive impact of a nuclear weapon (N) is mainly due to the blast and 
thermal radiation as well the electromagnetic pulse created by the explosion. Radioactive 
material is also created in the explosion. The radiation danger zone depends on factors 
including the size and explosion altitude of the nuclear weapon: impacts range from a 
few kilometres to several thousands of kilometres; in the worst case scenario, unprotected 
persons may experience radiation sickness symptoms even at distances of a few hundred 
kilometres from the explosion site.
Even small amounts of explosives (E) may cause major destruction in unprotected targets. 
In such cases, injuries and fatalities are primarily caused by fragments spread by the explo-
sive. Damage from pressure impact would require considerably larger amounts of explo-
sives. Explosives can also be used to spread hazardous substances or organisms.
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4 Prevention and control of CBRNE threats
The starting point and objective of the authorities’ and other actors’ CBRNE countermeas-
ures is to be able to prevent CBRNE incidents. Despite preventive measures, preparedness 
is also created for CBRNE accidents and threat situations. In any CBRNE incidents, the au-
thorities’ cooperation aims to identify the nature of the incidents, minimise the impacts of 
the incidents, launch rescue and investigation measures, normalise the situation and take 
care of timely communications of the right kind as required. The objective is also to ensure 
security of supply in all circumstances.
Powers and command relationships are determined in accordance with the nature and 
scope of the incident. The responsible authorities and other actors have their respective 
duties and roles in all CBRNE incidents (unintentional and intentional). Cooperation plays 
a key role.
Due to the seriousness and potentially large-scale impacts of CBRNE incidents, there is a 
need to act in cooperation with international partners and/or actors and request for inter-
national assistance where the situation so requires.
CBRNE incident prevention and preparedness
The starting point and objective is to prevent the emergence of CBRNE incidents. Finland 
advances the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and relat-
ed hazardous substances and expertise as well as illicit arms trafficking through political 
means and supervision and control conducted by authorities. In addition, the objective is 
to improve global heath security through preventive measures.
CBRNE threat assessment and situation picture formulation take place in national and in-
ternational cooperation between the various authorities and actors. Cross-border CBRNE 
threats are mapped using intelligence, criminal intelligence, military intelligence, infor-
mation exchange between health authorities and through other authorities’ internation-
al information exchange channels and cooperation. National cooperation maintains the 
CBRNE threat assessment and situation picture. The up-to-dateness of legislation and 
16
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATIONS  32/2017
other norms and guidelines is ensured through national measures and by influencing EU 
legislation. CBRNE activities are regulated by measures such as restrictions on import, ex-
port, purchase, use, transport and possession, authorisations and land use planning, and 
international prohibition agreements and arrangements. CBRNE operators’ safety and se-
curity arrangements and supervision and control conducted by authorities protect CBRNE 
substances against illegal activities. The level of regulation varies between the sectors.
The capability of the responsible authorities to detect and identify CBRNE substances and 
persons suspected of their possession and unlawful use, particularly at international bor-
ders, transport hubs and other important locations, plays a key role. CBRNE protection is 
maintained at critical locations. Capabilities and conditions for detection vary depending 
on the substance.
The operating conditions required for response to CBRNE incidents are created through 
joint planning, material preparations, training and exercises as well as preparedness ar-
rangements between authorities and the various CBRNE actors.
CBRNE incident management
Identifying abnormal events as CBRNE incidents is required to launch the correct meas-
ures. The correct level of measures is ensured by dynamic, incident-specific threat and haz-
ard assessments.
If a CBRNE incident materialises, damage is minimised and threat expansion is prevented. 
Actions taken to achieve these include CBRNE incident assessment and decision-making, 
CBRNE substances intelligence and identification, dispersion assessment, warning the 
public and other actors, rendering CBRNE substances and explosives harmless, rescue and 
decontamination measures, prehospital emergency medical services, evacuation, isola-
tion, quarantine, treatment and care measures, and protection of the environment. Re-
sponse actions are focused on saving human lives, stopping the activity causing a hazard 
and preventing any further damage. Any threat still potentially existing on the scene and 
the requirements of crime scene investigations must be taken into account in all actions.
The need for leadership coordination between the various authorities is emphasised in 
CBRNE incidents. Incident command responsibilities depend on the nature of the incident. 
The other authorities and actors support the commanding authority in the joint incident 
organisation. Maintaining a common situation picture and shared communication system 
is crucial. Key roles are also played by coordinated communications by the responsible au-
thorities to convey accurate information and prevent the spread of and correct any false 
information.
17
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Communications help to ensure the provision of accurate and timely information relating 
to CBRNE substances and the incident to the authorities and the population to enable the 
correct protection measures and prevent any further damage and psychological impacts.
The management of cross-border, large-scale and long-term incidents calls for interna-
tional exchange of information, cooperation or arrangements and possible international 
assistance if the incident so requires.
18
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5 Areas of development and measures 
required 
The following development needs and measures to achieve the Strategy objectives were 
identified in the strategy work. 
5.1 Improving the coordination of CBRNE activities
National, regional and local guidance and cooperation are to be improved comprehen-
sively in CBRNE activities, taking science and technology developments into account. The 
authorities and private sector actors and international cooperation are to be taken into 
account in the activities.
Measure Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Appoint a permanent CBRNE coordination group in 2018. Ministry of the Interior
Ensure the national compatibility of operating methods and systems. CBRNE coordination group
Improve the conditions for cooperation in CBRNE projects. CBRNE coordination group
Increase awareness of international CBRNE cooperation between actors. CBRNE coordination group
Review and utilise joint funding opportunities for research, development 
and other activities.
CBRNE coordination group 
Evaluate the implementation of the CBRNE Strategy and develop it on the 
basis of the evaluation.
CBRNE coordination group
19
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATIONS  32/2017 NATIONAL CBRNE STRATEGY 2017
5.2 Maintaining common situation awareness
A common understanding among all actors of CBRNE threats, the situation picture con-
cerning the operating environment and the grounds for the various actors’ preparedness 
is to be ensured. Intelligence cooperation is to generate information for CBRNE threat as-
sessment. The common understanding of threats is to lay the foundation for preparedness 
planning, training and exercises and development of activities.
Measure Main responsible actor/Other responsib-
le actor(s) 
Maintain the authorities’ common understanding of threats through 
regular threat assessment work.
Ministry of the Interior/CBRNE coordination 
group
Improve communication of threat assessment, situation picture and 
intelligence information between administrative branches.
Ministry of the Interior, Government Situation 
Centre/ministries, CBRNE coordination group
Improve awareness of operators and research institutions of CBRNE threats 
and security risks.
Responsible authorities, cooperation partners
Increase the efficiency of utilising the results of international exchange of 
information in cooperation between the authorities and development of 
activities; strengthen international cooperation networks.
Ministries, expert institutions, CBRNE coordination 
group
5.3 Further developing the risk-based approach to supervision
Permit systems, supervision and safety and security arrangements are to be employed to 
prevent access to CBRNE substances and information beyond the scope of lawful activ-
ities. The authorities will provide regulations and instructions, information and training. 
Operators will also carry out self-initiated preventive work. The operator will always be re-
sponsible for the implementation of instructions and regulations and the safety of its own 
activities. CBRNE management will be part of the operating culture and risk management 
of operators, enterprises and research and education institutions.
Measures Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Identify locations critical to safety and security. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finnish Safety and 
Chemicals Agency (Tukes), National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)/
responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group, operators
Target the surveillance of CBRNE locations using 
the risk-based approach.
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finnish Safety and 
Chemicals Agency (Tukes), National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)/
responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Guide, support and commit operators towards 
active development of in-house monitoring and 
protection.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group, operators
Review and clarify the supervision duties of the 
authorities and increase supervisory cooperation.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
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5.4 Ensuring up-to-date legislation on CBRNE activities
There is variation in the level of legislation and other norms and guidelines concerning the 
various sectors of CBRNE activities. Shortcomings and needs for amendments in legisla-
tion on CBRNE activities and any other need for norm-based guidance are to be identified 
and assessed. In addition, other guidance is to be developed instead of further adminis-
trative obligations. Amendments of key importance as regards the prevention of CBRNE 
threats are to be made.
Measures Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s) 
Assess and propose development needs concerning legislation: import and 
export legislation, transfer and possession, and authorisation procedures.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination 
group
5.5 Detecting and preventing intentional actions
The aim is to prevent CBRNE incidents through prevention. The detection and prevention 
of CBRNE threats and opportunities to address intentional actions are to be developed.
Measures Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Improve international and national exchange of information concerning 
CBRNE threats between safety and security authorities and other 
authorities.
Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo), 
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Police, 
Customs, Defence Forces, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, including Finland’s missions abroad, other 
responsible authorities, CBRNE cooperation forum
Take CBRNE threats into account as part of other measures to counter 
terrorism, extremism and serious crime.
Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo), 
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Police, 
Customs, Finnish Border Guard, Defence Forces, 
CBRNE cooperation forum
Develop the capabilities of the authorities to identify CBRNE substances 
and persons suspected of their possession and unlawful use in customs 
and border control.
Finnish Border Guard, Customs, National Bureau 
of Investigation (NBI), Police, other responsible 
authorities
Ensure that operators have access to a mechanism for reporting any 
abnormal observations to the authorities.
Police
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5.6 Enhancing the capacity for cooperation
Training and exercises are to be used to ensure the competencies and capacity for coop-
eration of all actors, and the effectiveness of activities in CBRNE incidents are to be evalu-
ated. National and international training opportunities are to be taken into account in the 
activities.
Measure Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Determine the national training level requirements for each sector. CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Develop training, taking national, regional, sectoral and collaborative 
requirements and international cooperation opportunities into account.
CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Systematise exercise activities at the various levels; standardise 
cooperation exercises. Take international cooperation into account in 
exercises.
CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Coordinate the implementation of improvements to be carried out on the 
basis of cooperation exercises.
CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
5.7 Identifying, managing and investigating CBRNE incidents
Identifying a situation as a CBRNE incident is crucial for incident management. CBRNE in-
cident management is to take place to minimise damage and prevent any further damage 
or damage expansion and restore normal conditions. Investigations are to be conducted 
to establish what has happened and whether the incident is an intentional CBRNE threat 
situation and to identify the perpetrators.
Measures Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Improve the ability to identify CBRNE incidents as quickly as possible. Responsible authorities,
CBRNE coordination group
Ensure the existence and availability of sufficient capacities for CBRNE 
incident identification, management and investigation locally, regionally 
and nationally.
Responsible authorities,
CBRNE coordination group
Develop systems used and operating models applied in the detection, 
identification and incident management relating to CBRNE substances 
with a view to national compatibility.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination 
group
Ensure sufficient technical capacity for field and laboratory analyses 
and identification as well as expertise, including first response units’ 
measuring equipment, concerning CBRNE substances.
Responsible authorities,
CBRNE coordination group
Ensure sufficient capacities of healthcare and other authorities for CBRNE 
incidents.
Ministry for Social Affairs and Health, health and 
social services actors, National Emergency Supply 
Agency, CBRNE coordination group
Conduct a national CBRNE capacities analysis and review areas in need of 
development using methods including scenario planning.
CBRNE coordination group
Describe the general operating models for CBRNE incidents. CBRNE coordination group
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5.8 Making communications part of CBRNE incident 
management
Communications are an important part of the prevention and management of CBRNE in-
cidents nationally and internationally. Appropriate communications are to provide timely 
and accurate information about incidents and their impacts, prevent the dissemination of 
false information and support incident management. 
Measures Main responsible actor/Other responsible actor(s)
Develop coherent, effective and structured communications concerning 
CBRNE threats and incidents.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination 
group
Improve the conditions for joint communications relating to CBRNE 
incidents. 
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination 
group
Practise joint communications of authorities and other actors in 
preparation for CBRNE incidents.
Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination 
group
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6 Preparation and implementation of the 
Strategy
The preparation of the national CBRNE Strategy was steered by a CBRNE strategy working 
group appointed by the Ministry of the Interior in which all key authorities were repre-
sented (Appendix 1). Government reports and strategies from recent years, such as the 
2016 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, the 2017 Government’s 
Defence Report, the Security Strategy for Society 2017, the 2016 Government Report on 
Internal Security and the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy for 2014–2017, were taken 
into account in strategy formulation.
The CBRNE coordination group will monitor and update the Strategy regularly. Changes in 
the operating environment, including those affecting the roles and responsibilities of the 
actors, will be taken into account in the maintenance and implementation of the Strategy. 
The main responsible actors will launch and monitor the implementation of the Strategy 
concerning the measures for which they are responsible and report on them as agreed to 
the CBRNE coordination group to be established. Where necessary, the CBRNE coordina-
tion group will report to the Security Committee on the implementation of the Strategy. 
The implementation will require preparation and more detailed phasing by administrative 
branches. CBRNE threats and required preparedness should also be brought up in other 
security strategies and corresponding guidance documents. All responsible actors must 
incorporate the objectives of the Strategy into their activity and resource planning.
The CBRNE coordination group will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the 
measures and take further measures where necessary. Some of the measures and projects 
under this Strategy may require further resource allocation. These resource impacts and 
the ways in which these resources could be secured will be specified in detail during their 
preparation. Where necessary, any needs for further resources will be addressed in con-
junction with government spending limits and budget procedures.
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A P P E N D I C E S 
Appendix 1. Strategy working group
The strategy working group appointed by the Ministry of the Interior consisted of the 
following actors:
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
Ministry of the Environment
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment
Ministry of Defence
Finnish Border Guard
Emergency Services College
Helsinki City Rescue Department
Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi)
National Police Board
Finnish Security Intelligence Service
National Bureau of Investigation
Helsinki Police Department
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes)
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
Customs
Finnish Transport Agency
Suomen pelastusjohtajat (association of chief executive officers of regional rescue 
services)
Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)
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Appendix 2. Key CBRNE actors and responsibilities/  
responsibility areas
Responsible actor Responsibility area
Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs  
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for multilateral agreement arrangements relating to CBRNE 
issues, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Ministry is also responsible for various multilateral political initiatives, such 
as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), nuclear safety cooperation (IAEA and other 
international initiatives) and G-7 Global Partnership. In addition, the Ministry’s responsibilities include the 
UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons 
and matters relating to the 1540 Committee. Representatives of other authorities also take part in the 
cooperation. Export control is a key measure in the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and related materials, and several authorities participate in this.
The Ministry acts as the authorisation authority for the processing of export authorisations of dual-use 
items in Finland and coordinates Finland’s participation in related activities in the EU and in the context of 
international arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group.
VERIFIN Operating under the University of Helsinki, the activities of the Finnish Institute for Verification of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) are based on the Convention and national legislation. 
The institute operates under the guidance of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as the National Authority 
referred to in the Convention. VERIFIN is a designated laboratory (for environmental and biomedical 
samples) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and receives and analyses 
samples submitted by the OPCW. VERIFIN is an accredited testing laboratory (FINAS T073) with real-time 
preparedness for the verification of chemical weapons and toxins of biological origin from environmental 
and material samples and samples obtained from victims.
Ministry of the 
Interior
The Ministry of the Interior guides and supervises police, rescue service and emergency response centre 
activities and drafts relevant legislation. The Ministry drafts legislation relating to border security and 
maritime search and rescue and is responsible for the performance management of the Finnish Border 
Guard.
Rescue services The rescue services prepare for CBRNE threats by allocating the necessary equipment, training personnel 
and contributing to supervision. CBRNE risks have been taken into account in the operational planning 
of the rescue services. During CBRNE incidents, the rescue authorities direct and carry out emergency 
operations. In such cases, emergency operations may include hazardous substance intelligence and 
identification, leak elimination or substance collection, and decontamination, treatment, care and 
evacuation of injured and exposed persons. In addition to these, the rescue authorities issue orders for 
evacuation, protective evacuation and the sheltering indoors of persons.
Police The police have an extensive responsibility area relating to CBRNE threats and incidents. This includes 
intelligence and preventive measures, incident identification and management measures, technical and 
tactical incident investigations, including forensic laboratory examinations, and provision of information 
about incidents.
The police operate as part of the national representation in EU programmes and committees to prevent 
threats relating to CBRNE substances. CBRNE threat developments and the CBRNE situation picture are 
monitored through INTERPOL and Europol connections and databases. The police monitor the situation 
picture within their mandate 24/7 on the basis of information collected by the Helsinki and Oulu command 
centres and the Police, Customs and Border Guard (PCB) Criminal Intelligence Centre of the National Bureau 
of Investigation.
Following a criminal CBRNE threat, incident command responsibility is transferred to the police once 
any emergency operations have been completed. As appropriate for the incident in question, the police 
use other authorities in the CBRNE cooperation network in incident identification and management 
measures. The police are responsible for tactical and technical investigations into cases. The police are also 
responsible for forensic laboratory examinations, supported by special competencies of other authorities 
where necessary.
In addition, the police are responsible for providing information relating to cases, supported by other 
authorities.
26
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATIONS  32/2017
Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service 
(Supo)
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service conveys information it has obtained through its intelligence 
and international cooperation for the coordination group’s CBRNE situation assessments and threat 
assessments.
Finnish Border 
Guard
The Finnish Border Guard prevents CBRNE threats by taking part, in conjunction with its core duties, in the 
control of CBRNE substances and conducting border checks in passenger traffic. During CBRNE incidents, 
the Border Guard is responsible for the rescue of persons at sea and supports the responsible authorities 
in their duties. The Border Guard maintains preparedness for CBRNE activities in accordance with its core 
duties in all circumstances.
Ministry of Defence The Ministry of Defence is tasked with the preparation and implementation of the defence policy and 
with military national defence. The Ministry’s duties also include matters such as arms control and 
disarmament, export control of military equipment, and armaments cooperation. CBRNE threats and 
related preparedness are also included in the Ministry’s duties. 
Finnish Defence 
Forces
The Finnish Defence Forces maintain preparedness for CBRNE incidents in all security situations. The 
Defence Forces have personnel, equipment and troops suitable for detection and identification, sampling 
and analysis, decontamination of persons and materials, and explosive ordnance disposal. The Defence 
Forces also have special competencies relating to CBRN laboratory analytics, CBRN protection and 
explosives.
Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health guides and supervises activities in accordance with legislation 
including the Communicable Diseases Act (583/1986), the Health Care Act (1326/2010), the Radiation Act 
(292/1991), the Chemicals Act (599/2013) and the Gene Technology Act (377/1995) and drafts relevant 
legislation. 
National Institute 
for Health and 
Welfare (THL)
The National Institute for Health and Welfare is the national expert institute for the prevention of 
communicable diseases dangerous to human health and for environmental health: it supports the 
Government and health and social services actors through its risk assessments concerning infection and 
environmental threats, monitoring, reference laboratory activities, preparedness, prevention and control 
duties. Where necessary, the THL provides recommendations for action and supports the administrative 
branch of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in communications relating to special situations. The 
THL is the National IHR Focal Point under the WHO’s International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) and 
the national competent authority under Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on serious cross-border threats to health, operating the 24/7 Early Warning and Response 
System intended for national and international authorities. The THL maintains and coordinates national 
microbiological diagnostic preparedness, including through intergovernmental agreements, for threats of 
serious and unforeseen infectious diseases.
Centre for Biothreat 
Preparedness 
(BUOS)
The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (BUOS) is a joint expert organisation of the National Institute 
for Health and Welfare (THL) and the Defence Forces, which combines the resources of the THL and 
the Defence Forces in the prevention of and preparedness for biological threats, particularly regarding 
intentional release.
Centre of Excellence 
for Serious Chemical 
Threats 
The Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats is a cooperation network for various experts in 
chemical threats set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and coordinated by the Finnish Institute 
of Occupational Health. The Centre of Excellence maintains a 24/7 expert service and a database on 
analytics providers and preparedness.
Poison Information 
Centre
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has assigned the Poison Information Centre with the responsibility 
for action as regards chemical poisonings, mass poisonings and other rare poisonings. The Poison 
Information Service operates a 24/7 telephone helpline for questions relating to the prevention and 
treatment of acute poisonings. The Centre provides a nationwide service, with advice available to the 
general public and healthcare professionals. The Centre also acts as a source of information for the 
authorities and media.
Health and social 
services actors
Health and social services actors in the health sector (including municipal health and environmental 
health authorities, hospital districts and Regional State Administrative Agencies) are responsible in their 
respective areas for preparedness for CBRNE threats and for the organisation of prehospital emergency 
medical services. During CBRNE incidents, emergency medical services duties include assessing the need 
for treatment and care of exposed persons, and providing emergency patients with prehospital care and 
transport to hospital. Local and regional health and social services actors participate in risk assessment and 
take care of any isolation, quarantine and hospital care of persons who are injured, affected by a disease or 
exposed.
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Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety 
Authority 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) supervises the safety of the use of nuclear power and 
radiation and operators’ safety and security arrangements in case of unlawful activity. STUK is in charge 
of the national implementation of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which also covers sensitive 
information and technology. STUK coordinates and conducts research into and development of radiation 
and nuclear safety from the perspectives of national needs.
STUK maintains a 24/7 on-call service and preparedness to launch response to accidents or unlawful 
activity relating to nuclear power plants or radiation sources. STUK assesses the potential impacts of the 
incident, analyses and interprets radiation observations made by first-response authorities on the basis 
of the remote support concept established for the use of authorities including the Police, Customs and the 
Finnish Border Guard, conducts supplementary on-scene measurements where necessary, and provides 
recommendations for radiation protection measures.
STUK participates in international cooperation and exchange of information in the field of nuclear and 
radiation safety.
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
and Employment
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment is in charge of the supreme supervision, guidance and 
legislative drafting concerning the production, warehousing, storage and use of hazardous chemicals and 
explosives.
The Ministry is responsible for the performance management of the National Emergency Supply Agency 
and the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency.
Finnish Safety and 
Chemicals Agency 
(Tukes)
Tukes is a licensing and supervisory authority that supervises the safety of products, services and chemicals 
and implements related legislation in C and E matters in particular. Tukes does not have an operational 
role in CBRNE incidents. Instead, its role focuses on preventive activities carried out in conjunction with the 
supervision of operators. 
The focus of legislation and supervision is on promoting safety, but in some respects provisions also take 
into account some threats arising from intentional, criminal or terrorist activity. Preparedness for such 
threats includes requirements imposed on location, enclosure and locking and procedures restricting 
access to explosives and their precursors. These include the transfer certificate procedure restricting 
the acquisition of explosives, the explosives identification and traceability system, and restriction and 
authorisation procedures concerning precursors.
National Emergency 
Supply Agency 
(NESA)
In cooperation with hospital districts, NESA holds security stockpiles of key healthcare supplies, such 
as cannulae, infusion devices and hypodermic syringes. Antivirals are stockpiled for use in the event of 
pandemics (B).  Importers of medicinal products and pharmaceutical plants have a statutory obligation 
to stockpile an amount of medicinal products covering normal consumption for 3–6 months. NESA pays 
compensation for capital committed to compulsory stockpiles of medicinal products.
Finnish Food Safety 
Authority Evira
Evira’s responsibility area covers chemical and biological risks relating to food, animals and plants 
(including food fraud and zoonotic, animal and plant diseases). Evira’s role is to be the national leader of 
the supervision and prevention of related risks, carry out some of the supervision and laboratory analytics, 
risk assessments and scientific research relating to these risks.
Finnish 
Meteorological 
Institute (FMI)
The Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) operates a Safety Weather Service with continuous 
preparedness for action in CBRNE incidents. The FMI has 24/7 preparedness for calculating the transport of 
radioactive and hazardous substances in the atmosphere and sea using dispersion models.
The FMI acts as the meteorological expert and supports the activities of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) in radiation incidents. The FMI provides weather data required by actors involved in 
incident management, such as the rescue services, the Government Situation Centre and agencies in the 
administrative branch of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The FMI is prepared for assigning 
a meteorologist for a liaison and consultation role with STUK in the event of a serious radiation incident. 
The FMI secures the reception of alerts and the alerting of STUK through the 24/7 Safety Weather Service.
Customs Customs is tasked with protecting society by, for example, preventing the smuggling of narcotics and other 
hazardous substances. Customs controls the imports of chemicals into Finland from outside the EU and 
ensures in a risk-based manner that imported chemicals have been registered appropriately.
Customs controls the exports of hazardous chemicals to destinations outside the EU.
Customs controls and seeks to prevent the entry of biological pathogens, i.e. animal diseases, to Finland 
from outside the EU.
Customs controls the intra-EU transfers and imports into and exports out of the EU of radioactive materials. 
Customs controls the imports and exports of nuclear materials (including nuclear weapons) to and from 
the EU as well as their intra-EU transfers. Customs controls the imports of explosives from outside the EEA. 
Customs controls the exports from and transit via Finland of explosives classified as armaments.
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